Забавная история из мемуаров Тома Барри : После третьей неудачной попытки подорвать ворота казармы, командиры догадались, что в их летучем отряде никто не умеет обращаться со взрывчаткой...
спасибо... Надо бы показать это специалистам вроде старикова, который утверждает, что Британия умышленно помогала красным в ходе гражданской войны в России, потому что тут совершенно ясно сделан вывод о неспособности Британии контролировать всю обширную территории империи, вот , даже у себя под боком ничего не смогли сделать... Но ведь прицепиться он к фразе про американское влияние и будет банки сочинять о том, что это американцы с Британией за сферы влияния боролись...
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The creation of paramilitary police, largely under separate command and control arrangements, to fill this gap in the security forces became disastrous when a reprisals policy, in lieu of proper policing methods, brought international opprobrium and alienated the police from the public. Any guerrilla warfare experience from the Boer War had long been forgotten. The problems of intelligence meant that force could not be targeted and the inevitable excesses fuelled the Sinn Fein propaganda machine. However, in early 1920 and then a year later, the army appeared to be on top of the situation. A fresh deployment of troops, which was threatened by the British team negotiating the Treaty in 1921, may have defeated the IRA, but by now the Sinn Fein movement was unstoppable. The opportunity to avoid war was lost 6 years earlier, with the heavy-handed response to Easter and the dilatory approach to the introduction of Home Rule.
Despite lacking arms and training, the Irish revolutionaries were not to be dealt with as easily as in previous insurrections. A disciplined movement with efficient intelligence and counter-intelligence elements, it proved itself resilient although arguably it was on its last legs in most of the country, except for a few areas such as Cork which offered stubborn resistance. The guerrilla campaign was conducted alongside a political movement with an effective propaganda arm, which was particularly influential in the United States. The Sinn Fein movement had widespread active public support and where it was not active, there was at least acquiescence that it was worth putting up with the hardships, including the British reprisals. Martyrdom, which seems to have been a desired outcome of the 1916 rebellion, continued in the form of hunger strikes that put enormous pressure on the British to grant concessions. The eventual resolution involving partition, under terms ultimately dictated by the British, did not immediately bring peace to Ireland and even after the British left in 1922, for the next 18 months things would get a lot worse North and South of the island, before they got better. Although mature democratic parties exist today, the physical force component of Irish republicanism still has a reason to exist and the killings in March 2009 proved that Ireland can still be a dangerous place for a British soldier. The combination of archival releases and simulation techniques means that the OR community now has tools and the data to model this campaign and possibly to understand further counter insurgency within the context of societal conflict.
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